Published Work
- “Ignorance and Duty: The Objective/Subjective Distinction in Ethics” The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics (forthcoming).
- “Non-Ideal Prescriptions for the Morally Uncertain,” Philosophical Studies (2021).
- “Dispensing with the Subjective Moral 'Ought',” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 11 (2021).
- “Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2019).
- “Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 13 (2018).
- “A Priorism in Moral Epistemology” (with Michael DePaul) in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016, updated 2021).
- “Particularism Doesn't Flatten,” in the Journal of Moral Philosophy (2016).
Curriculum Vitae
Current Projects
NeuroDiving
NeuroDiving is a philosophy podcast about neurodivergence. NeuroDiving is co-produced with Joanna Lawson, and supported by both the Marc Sanders Foundation and the Templeton Foundation.
Past Projects
Non-Ideal Ethical Theories and Moral Uncertainty
I've written several papers about how non-ideal ethical theory can resolve a variety of problems related to moral uncertainty. These papers include “Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons,” “Dispensing with the Subjective Moral 'Ought',” “Non-Ideal prescriptions for the Morally Uncertain,” and “Ignorance and Duty: The Objective/Subjective Distinction in Ethics.”
Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison
Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty (where moral uncertainty is an epistemic state in which one's credences are divided between moral propositions). They conclude from this that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to moral uncertainty. This conclusion is surprising; if it's correct, then there's no rational requirement that moral uncertainty affect one's moral deliberation, even if one cares about acting in accordance with moral norms.
In my paper “Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison,” I argue that one has a rational obligation to take one's moral uncertainty into account in the course of deliberation (at least in some cases). I first provide positive motivation for the view that one's moral beliefs can affect what it's rational for one to choose. I then address the problem of value comparison, which shows that when we're uncertain between competing moral propositions, we cannot determine the expected moral value of our actions. I argue that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty; even if there is no way of determining the “expected moral value” of one's actions in cases of moral uncertainty, a morally-motivated decision-maker can still have preferences over lotteries that entail the existence of rational requirements for choice.
The A Priori in Moral Epistemology
Dissertation
My doctoral dissertation was on moral particularism, the view (roughly speaking) that moral generalizations shouldn’t play a role in moral theory.
There are two kinds of moral particularism: eliminativism, according to which there exist no true moral principles, and abstinence, according to which one should never use moral principles in moral deliberation. In my dissertation, I argue that while at least one version of eliminativism is defensible, abstinence is untenable; however, I only take a few steps towards developing what I think is a good particularist theory of moral deliberation.
I published a paper in the Journal of Moral Philosophy titled “Particularism Doesn't Flatten,” which was based on a chapter of my dissertation.