Amelia Hicks
Department of Philosophy
Kansas State University

Published Work

CV

Past Projects

Dissertation

My doctoral dissertation was on moral particularism, the view (roughly speaking) that moral generalizations shouldn’t play a role in moral theory.

There are two kinds of moral particularism: eliminativism, according to which there exist no true moral principles, and abstinence, according to which one should never use moral principles in moral deliberation. In my dissertation, I argue that while at least one version of eliminativism is defensible, abstinence is untenable; however, I only take a few steps towards developing what I think is a good particularist theory of moral deliberation.

I published a paper in the Journal of Moral Philosophy titled “Particularism Doesn't Flatten,” which was based on a chapter of my dissertation.

Moral Epistemology

A priori moral justification plays different sorts of roles in different cognitivist metaethical theories. I co-authored an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on this topic.

Current Projects

Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison

Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty (where moral uncertainty is an epistemic state in which one's credences are divided between moral propositions). They conclude from this that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to moral uncertainty. This conclusion is surprising; if it's correct, then there's no rational requirement that moral uncertainty affect one's moral deliberation, even if one cares about acting in accordance with moral norms.

In this paper, I argue that one has a rational obligation to take one's moral uncertainty into account in the course of deliberation (at least in some cases). I first provide positive motivation for the view that one's moral beliefs can affect what it's rational for one to choose. I then address the problem of value comparison, which shows that when we're uncertain between competing moral propositions, we cannot determine the expected moral value of our actions. I argue that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty; even if there is no way of determining the “expected moral value” of one's actions in cases of moral uncertainty, a morally-motivated decision-maker can still have preferences over lotteries that entail the existence of rational requirements for choice.

Moral Fetishism and Responding to Reasons

According to “moral hedging,” one ought to exercise caution when one is morally uncertain. However, some philosophers have recently argued that moral hedging requires that one exhibit the wrong kind of moral concern (namely, de dicto, as opposed to de re, moral concern). Call this objection the “fetishism objection” to moral hedging. Proponents of the fetishism objection often draw from a reasons-responsiveness account of the moral worth of actions, according to which (roughly) an action has moral worth only if one is motivated to perform that action by the reasons that morally justify the action.

In my paper, I examine the relationship between the reasons-responsiveness view and the moral fetishism objection. First, I argue that one can consistently accept the reasons-responsiveness view while also accepting that one ought to exercise caution when morally uncertain; one can accept both by adopting a particular account of what we have moral reason to do. Second, I describe the two types of moral fetishism that are objectionable by the lights of a reasons-responsiveness account, and argue that moral hedging need not involve either type.

Ultimately, I hope to show that those of us who accept reasons-responsiveness views about moral worth can accommodate the idea that epistemic humility—even about moral matters—is a moral virtue.

Rational Norms and Moral Norms

At the end of “Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison,” I note that if my conclusion—namely, that moral uncertainty can affect what one is rationally obligated to do—is correct, then it may turn out that rational and moral norms are significantly different from each other. Titelbaum has argued that uncertainty about the a priori truths concerning rationality is itself a rational failure; thus, if he's correct, and if it's not a rational failure to be uncertain about moral truths, then the rational standards for choice under moral uncertainty are less stringent than the rational standards for choice under uncertainty about rational norms.

I plan to examine (a) whether this is correct and, if it is correct, (b) what this tells us about apparent analogies between different types of normative propositions.

Moral Recklessness and Collective Action

I also plan to argue that the rational and moral permissibility of taking moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation (in an attempt to avoid moral recklessness) can justify certain kinds of consumer behavior. Consequentialists often try to justify boycotting insensitive markets (markets that do not respond to the demands of an individual consumer, or to the demands of a small number of consumers) by appealing to the existence of thresholds at which reduced consumer demand will reduce production. However, I argue that these appeals to thresholds fail—in order for one to justify boycotting an insensitive market by appealing to the existence of such a threshold, one would also have to make one of several implausible assumptions about the behavior of other consumers. However, I do not conclude that it's irrational for one to boycott an insensitive market when one is uncertain about the behavior of other consumers; instead, I argue that one can reasonably boycott such a market in an attempt to avoid moral recklessness.

Future Projects

The Burden of Proof in Moral Debates

I plan to argue that moral recklessness—even moral recklessness that results from a failure to attend to one's moral uncertainty—can affect on whom the burden of proof falls in moral debates. There are plausible, often ignored dialectical principles that suggest that when one party in a moral debate is behaving in a way that’s prima facie reckless, the burden of proof falls on that party. The combination of these views—that one can be reckless under conditions of moral uncertainty, and that recklessness affects on whom the burden of proof falls—challenges the standard view about the burden of proof in moral debates, and has implications for how we answer certain questions in applied ethics.

Moral Uncertainty and Non-Ideal Moral Theory
I would like to develop a larger project in which I explore the relationship between moral uncertainty, subjective/objective moral obligation, and non-ideal moral theory.